Marshall v. The Port Authority of New York and New Jersey

Background

Cedric Marshall brought claims arising from his November 4, 2017 arrest in the Port Authority Bus Terminal. The opinion describes claims for false arrest under the Constitution and New York law, failure to intervene under federal and New York law, and malicious prosecution under New York law. Marshall says he had a bus ticket and was lawfully in an area limited to ticketed passengers, but that the officers arrested him without asking for the ticket. The defendants deny those allegations.

The court had previously granted in part and denied in part the defendants’ summary-judgment motion. Among other rulings, it dismissed all claims against the Port Authority and limited the federal false-arrest claims to injuries from the brief period between Marshall’s initial detention and the officers’ discovery of marijuana while transporting him to police command. The present opinion addresses motions in limine, which are pretrial requests asking the court to decide whether particular evidence or arguments may be presented at trial.

Defendants’ motion in limine

The defendants sought permission to question Marshall about prior convictions, aliases, and false information given to authorities. They also sought to bar evidence concerning officers Craig Carlson and John Tone, references to potential indemnification by the Port Authority, requests for specific damages amounts, and evidence about punitive damages during the liability phase of trial.

The court held that Marshall’s 2013 conviction for third-degree robbery could be used to impeach him if he testified. Impeachment means using evidence to challenge a witness’s credibility. The defendants may present the conviction’s statutory name, conviction date, and sentence. The court concluded that the conviction had meaningful value in assessing credibility, was not too old, was not too similar to the conduct at issue, and was important because Marshall’s credibility would be central at trial. The court also rejected Marshall’s argument that the conviction should be excluded because the defendants had not produced his criminal record during discovery.

The court excluded Marshall’s 2011 and 1978 convictions for fraudulent accosting. Because more than ten years would have passed by trial, the convictions were subject to the stricter rule governing convictions more than ten years old. The court found their value for evaluating truthfulness marginal and concluded that admitting them would more likely unfairly brand Marshall as a criminal than help the jury assess whether he was telling the truth.

The court permitted questioning about Marshall’s use of aliases and other false identifying information because that conduct could bear on his character for truthfulness. However, the defendants may not elicit that Marshall was arrested or convicted in connection with the occasions on which he used those aliases.

The court barred Marshall’s counsel from requesting a specific dollar amount for damages or suggesting a specific amount for non-economic damages. Counsel may refer to a specific amount for economic damages if the evidence supports it. The court also granted the unopposed requests to preclude evidence concerning Carlson and Tone, who were no longer defendants, and references to indemnification by the Port Authority.

The court granted the defendants’ request to separate the punitive-damages amount from the rest of the trial. The jury will first decide liability, compensatory damages, and whether punitive damages are warranted. Only if the jury finds that punitive damages are warranted will the amount of those damages be tried.

Marshall’s spoliation motion

Marshall sought spoliation sanctions based on the defendants’ failure to preserve surveillance recordings from the bus terminal. Spoliation refers to destroying, significantly altering, or failing to preserve evidence for anticipated litigation. The court denied the request.

The court concluded that Marshall had not shown that the relevant defendants had a duty to preserve the recordings when they were overwritten or that they acted with a culpable state of mind. The court also found no basis to conclude that the recordings would have contained useful evidence. In particular, the opinion states that there was no reason to believe the video would have captured the conversation about Marshall’s bus ticket or otherwise resolved whether the officers asked him to produce one. The court noted that its ruling did not decide whether a permissive instruction allowing the jury to draw an unfavorable inference might later be appropriate at trial.

Disposition

The defendants’ motion in limine was granted in part and denied in part. Marshall’s motion in limine and motion for spoliation sanctions were denied. The trial on the amount of punitive damages was severed from the trial on liability and compensatory damages. Judge Lewis J. Liman characterized the evidentiary rulings as preliminary determinations made in preparation for trial.