Collymore v. City Of New York

Background

Robin Collymore brought claims against the City of New York, Lisa Maluf, Matthew Austin, and David Kirks in their individual capacities and as alleged aiders and abettors. The claims arose from her employment at New York City’s Department of Information Technology and Telecommunications, where she worked as Project Manager of Training in the Emergency Communications Transformation Program.

Collymore alleged race and sex discrimination, sexual harassment, retaliation, and aiding and abetting under Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, 42 U.S.C. §§ 1981 and 1983, the New York State Human Rights Law, and the New York City Human Rights Law. She complained about Maluf’s unwanted touching and Austin’s hostile behavior, filed complaints with the agency’s equal-employment office, and later complained to Kirks. She resigned in June 2016, with an effective resignation date in July 2016.

The court had previously dismissed the federal claims under the rule governing failure to state a claim, while the Second Circuit later sent back Collymore’s Title VII and 42 U.S.C. § 1983 retaliation claims for further consideration. After discovery, the defendants moved for summary judgment on all remaining claims.

Federal Retaliation Claims

The court analyzed the Title VII and § 1983 retaliation claims using a three-step framework. Collymore had to show that she engaged in protected activity, the defendants knew about it, she experienced a materially adverse action, and the action was caused by her complaints. The court found that the first two requirements were undisputed because Collymore complained about unwanted touching and filed equal-employment complaints, and several defendants knew about those reports.

The court concluded, however, that Collymore did not provide enough evidence that the defendants took a materially adverse action. Her allegations that Maluf and Austin were harsh, yelled at her, criticized her work, and scrutinized her schedule were insufficient. The court considered her strongest remaining argument—that the defendants scheduled meetings during her lunch period despite her need to eat at a specific time because of migraines.

The court found that the timing of some meetings could support an initial inference of retaliation. It also found that the defendants offered a legitimate explanation: the meetings were infrequent, served business purposes, and were not targeted at Collymore. But the court held that Collymore did not provide enough additional evidence to show that explanation was a pretext, meaning a cover for unlawful retaliation. The April meetings were organized by a coworker who was not alleged to be part of the retaliation, and the February meetings were large group meetings involving more than 50 people.

The court also found insufficient evidence that Maluf or Austin knew Collymore needed a specific lunch hour because of her migraines. Collymore had not requested a workplace accommodation or disclosed that need in the medical documentation she provided. The court further noted evidence that employees could eat during the meetings. It therefore granted summary judgment dismissing the federal retaliation claims.

State and City Retaliation Claims

The court exercised supplemental jurisdiction over the remaining state and city claims because discovery was complete and those claims substantially overlapped with the federal claims. It held that the New York State retaliation claims failed for the same reasons as the Title VII claims.

Although the New York City Human Rights Law uses less demanding standards for adverse action and retaliatory motive, the court held that Collymore still needed evidence that retaliation played some part in the defendants’ actions. The court found that the evidence concerning infrequent scheduling of large group meetings that slightly overlapped with her stated lunch period was insufficient. It granted summary judgment dismissing the state and city retaliation claims.

Sexual-Harassment Claims

The court held that Collymore had not provided enough evidence that Maluf’s alleged unwanted touching was because of sex. Collymore had alleged that Maluf touched people broadly and testified that Maluf “touched everyone,” including men. The court found that Collymore’s contrary declaration—that Maluf touched women more than men—was conclusory and contradicted her deposition testimony. Maluf’s admission that she had touched two women also did not establish a pattern of harassment directed at women because of their sex.

The court therefore granted summary judgment on the New York State and New York City sexual-harassment claims.

Discrimination Claims

For the New York State claims, the court required evidence of a materially adverse employment action and circumstances suggesting discrimination. It found that Collymore had not substantiated her allegations that she was denied overtime more often than white male coworkers. She provided evidence of only one denied overtime request, while the defendants provided evidence that she received overtime on several occasions.

The court also found insufficient evidence that Collymore was treated worse than Rachel Cruz or Gene Yurman. Collymore did not show that Cruz was paid more or otherwise treated better in a materially significant way, and her allegations about male coworkers were unsupported. The court did not consider alleged out-of-court statements from witnesses who were not deposed or did not provide declarations sufficient evidence at summary judgment.

The court rejected the New York City discrimination claims as well. Collymore’s general statements about racial and sexist “micro-aggressions” lacked specific examples, and the other evidence she cited was inadmissible hearsay. The court granted summary judgment dismissing the state and city discrimination claims.

Aiding and Abetting

The court explained that aiding-and-abetting liability requires an underlying discriminatory or retaliatory violation. Because it granted summary judgment on all of Collymore’s predicate claims, it also granted summary judgment on all of her aiding-and-abetting claims.

Disposition

The court granted the defendants’ motion for summary judgment in its entirety. It directed the Clerk to enter judgment for the defendants and close the case, and canceled the scheduled pretrial conference.