Bellis v. New York City Department of Education

Background

Richard Bellis, a white man who worked for the New York City Department of Education (DOE) for more than three decades, alleged that the DOE used a race-based staffing policy associated with former Mayor Bill de Blasio and former DOE Chancellor Richard Carranza. Bellis’s remaining claim was a municipal-liability claim under 42 U.S.C. § 1983. To prevail on that claim, he had to show both an underlying constitutional violation—race discrimination against him—and that a DOE policy or custom caused that discrimination. His separate retaliation claim had been withdrawn.

Bellis had worked in the DOE since 1991 and was promoted several times. After the DOE restructured and renamed his division, he applied for two positions in the new division but was not selected. Mirza Sanchez-Medina selected Brenda Garcia for the position equivalent to Bellis’s former role and Rachel Hoff for the other position. Bellis later applied for other DOE positions, including a Borough Assessment Implementation Director position. The candidates were scored in multiple categories, and Bellis ranked second-to-last; the highest-ranked candidate, Laura Dalla Betta, was selected. The court also considered Bellis’s claim concerning an EduStat position but found the evidence insufficient even to establish an initial case of discrimination for that position.

Summary-Judgment Record

The DOE moved for summary judgment under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 56. Summary judgment is appropriate when the admissible evidence shows no genuine dispute over a fact that could affect the outcome and the moving party is entitled to judgment as a matter of law.

The court found that Bellis’s response to the DOE’s statement of facts did not comply fully with Local Civil Rule 56.1. In several instances, he disputed facts without citing supporting evidence, relied on lack of knowledge, inserted arguments instead of directly responding to the facts, or relied on statements in his declaration that conflicted with his earlier deposition testimony. The court deemed specified facts admitted, disregarded improper legal arguments and unsupported assertions, and considered Bellis’s declaration only when it was based on personal knowledge and consistent with other admissible evidence.

Underlying Discrimination Claim

The court applied the three-step burden-shifting framework used for employment-discrimination claims. Bellis had to present evidence supporting an initial inference of discrimination. The DOE then had to provide legitimate, nondiscriminatory reasons for its decisions. Bellis ultimately had to present enough evidence for a reasonable factfinder to conclude that those reasons were false and that race discrimination was the real reason—and, for his Section 1983 claim, the necessary cause—of the adverse employment actions.

The court assumed without deciding that Bellis could establish an initial case of discrimination concerning the DML positions and the BAID position. It nevertheless held that the DOE had offered legitimate, nondiscriminatory reasons. Sanchez-Medina testified that Garcia and Hoff were more qualified for the positions they received. For the BAID position, Bellis ranked second-to-last while Dalla Betta ranked first.

The court concluded that Bellis did not provide sufficient evidence that these explanations were a pretext for race discrimination. His assertions that he was more qualified, and his challenges to Sanchez-Medina’s testimony as self-serving, were not enough. The court also found insufficient evidence that other non-white employees received more comparable assignments, that Bellis’s alleged statements by other DOE employees reflected the decisionmakers’ intent, or that the hiring documents and emails showed decisions based on race. The fact that two of the three people hired instead of Bellis were white further weakened the claimed inference of racial discrimination.

Because Bellis failed to establish an underlying constitutional violation, the court held that the DOE was entitled to summary judgment on that basis alone.

Connection to a DOE Policy or Custom

The court separately held that Bellis’s claim failed because he could not show that any DOE policy or custom caused the decisions affecting him. The court assumed without deciding that de Blasio and Carranza may have supported a policy of considering race in some DOE employment decisions. It did not decide whether such a policy existed.

Instead, the court found no evidence connecting that alleged policy to the decisions involving Bellis. De Blasio and Carranza were not involved in the decisions. Sanchez-Medina made the DML decisions, and multiple people participated in the BAID rankings. The record did not show that these decisionmakers acted because of race or were carrying out instructions or expectations from de Blasio or Carranza. The court therefore found no direct causal link between the alleged policy and Bellis’s treatment.

Disposition

The DOE’s motion for summary judgment was granted. The court entered judgment in favor of the DOE, dismissed Bellis’s municipal-liability claim, directed the Clerk of Court to terminate the motion, and closed the case. The opinion did not state that the dismissal was with or without prejudice.