Chislett v. New York City Department of Education

Background

Leslie Chislett sued the New York City Department of Education and Richard Carranza, the Department’s then-Chancellor, under 42 U.S.C. § 1983. Section 1983 provides a way to seek relief for violations of federal constitutional rights by state or local actors. Chislett alleged that Defendants discriminated against her because she is white, in violation of the Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment.

Chislett began working for the Department in 2007 and became Executive Director of the “AP for All” program in 2017. In March 2019, Courtney Winkfield removed Chislett’s supervisory duties. Chislett kept her salary and benefits but no longer supervised Department employees. Winkfield attributed the decision to feedback from nearly every team member that Chislett was an ineffective leader who created chaos and a negative work environment. Chislett’s last day at the Department was May 23, 2019. After exhausting her medical leave, she wrote that she was unable to return to work.

Chislett also described implicit-bias, racial-literacy, and other workplace trainings and meetings in which participants allegedly made comments about whiteness, white privilege, white supremacy, and race. She argued that these events were connected to a Department policy that made race a decisive factor in employment decisions. Her New York City Human Rights Law claims had already been voluntarily dismissed with prejudice, leaving her Section 1983 claim before the court.

Legal standard

The court considered Defendants’ motion for summary judgment under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 56. Summary judgment is appropriate when the evidence shows that there is no genuine dispute over a fact that could affect the result and the moving party is entitled to judgment under the law. The court viewed the evidence and reasonable inferences in Chislett’s favor, but explained that a party opposing summary judgment must present more than unsupported or conclusory assertions.

Because Chislett sued the Department and Carranza, she had to show both a constitutional violation and a municipal policy or custom that caused it. This requirement is commonly called municipal liability. For the claim against Carranza, she also had to show his personal involvement in the alleged violation or that he created or maintained the relevant policy or custom.

For the employment-discrimination theory, the court applied a burden-shifting framework. Under Section 1983, Chislett had to show that her race actually played a role in the challenged decision and had a determinative influence—that is, that the decision would not have occurred for the stated reason alone.

Demotion claim

The court assumed, without deciding, that Chislett had made an initial showing sufficient to proceed under the employment-discrimination framework. It nevertheless held that she did not provide evidence from which a reasonable jury could find that Defendants’ stated reasons for removing her supervisory authority were false or a pretext for racial discrimination.

Winkfield testified that she observed Chislett’s interactions and received an “almost universal” pattern of negative feedback. The feedback described Chislett as an ineffective leader who created chaos and a negative work environment. The complaints came from people Chislett supervised, people who supervised her, and Department colleagues. The court also noted that at least three white employees complained to Winkfield about Chislett’s leadership and that an Office of Equal Opportunity and Diversity Management report independently found that some of Chislett’s comments were inappropriate.

The court found that Chislett did not rebut this evidence. Her statements that she disputed Winkfield’s testimony and was unaware of the complaints were not enough to create a genuine factual dispute. The court therefore held that the record did not permit a reasonable jury to find that racial discrimination was the decisive cause of the removal of Chislett’s supervisory authority.

The court separately held that Chislett had not shown municipal liability. The evidence suggested, at most, that former Mayor Bill de Blasio and Carranza believed Department leadership should reflect New York City’s diversity. The court found no evidence that Defendants adopted a policy making race a decisive factor in all Department employment decisions, including the decision involving Chislett. Statements about seeking a diverse group of candidates or tracking the diversity of candidates did not, by themselves, show that qualifications or performance were disregarded. The court granted summary judgment to Defendants on the demotion theory.

Hostile-work-environment claim

A hostile-work-environment claim requires proof that discriminatory intimidation, ridicule, or insults were severe or pervasive enough to change the conditions of employment, and that the conduct occurred because of the plaintiff’s protected characteristic. Because Chislett sued only the Department and Carranza on this theory, she also had to connect the alleged environment to a Department policy or custom.

The court did not decide that the alleged workplace conduct necessarily failed the severity requirement. Instead, it held that Chislett had not shown that the conduct was caused by a municipal policy or custom. She did not connect the alleged employment policy—concerning race in employment decisions—to Carranza’s or the Department’s initiative involving implicit-bias trainings. The court also noted that many of the comments were made by colleagues during meetings or in other circumstances, rather than as part of an official training curriculum. Holding the Department liable for every comment made during a training or meeting would improperly impose liability merely because the Department employed the speakers.

The court further noted that some events Chislett relied on were separate from the Department’s implicit-bias-training initiative, including a training connected to a prior personnel incident, a Department-wide “Beyond Diversity” training, and the AP for All team’s racial-literacy trainings. Chislett also described the workplace as racially charged before the alleged policy or trainings, which weakened her effort to attribute the conditions to Carranza and the Department under his oversight. The court held that no reasonable jury could find that Defendants were the moving force behind the alleged hostile work environment and granted summary judgment on this theory.

Constructive-discharge claim

Chislett argued that her working conditions were so intolerable that they amounted to constructive discharge, meaning that a reasonable person would have felt compelled to resign. The court explained that this standard is more demanding than the standard for a hostile-work-environment claim.

Even assuming Chislett had raised a factual issue about whether the atmosphere was intolerable, the court held that she had not shown that Defendants’ alleged policy concerning race in employment decisions or the implicit-bias-training initiative caused the alleged constitutional violation. For the same municipal-liability reasons discussed for the hostile-work-environment claim, the court granted summary judgment to Defendants on the constructive-discharge theory.

Disposition

Judge Rochon granted Defendants’ motion for summary judgment. The court dismissed Chislett’s Section 1983 claim and directed the Clerk of Court to terminate the motion and close the case. The opinion does not state that this dismissal was with or without prejudice.