Martin v. City of San Jose

Background

This final pretrial conference order addressed preparations for a jury trial. The court scheduled a hearing by Zoom for December 4, 2020, concerning completed jury questionnaires, and set the jury trial to begin December 7, 2020. The parties estimated that trial would last about eight to ten days. The court allotted each side eleven hours for opening statements, witness examination, closing arguments, and voir dire of witnesses.

The court stated that three claims remained for trial after its earlier summary-judgment order: (1) Andy Martin’s claim under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 against Officer Alexandre Vieira Ribeiro; (2) Martin’s negligence claim against the City of San Jose; and (3) Martin’s claim under California Civil Code section 52.1 against the City.

Witnesses and Exhibits

The court directed both sides to reduce their witness lists and file revised lists by November 16, 2020. The parties were also directed to reduce their exhibit lists, try to resolve objections, and file revised exhibit lists by that date. They were to work out agreements about authenticity and business records to avoid requiring records custodians to testify.

The court gave several general evidentiary guidelines. It stated that relevant San Jose Police Department policies could potentially be admitted with proper foundation, but that irrelevant policies should not be admitted. Voluminous materials, including police-training materials, medical records, and lengthy video footage, were not to be admitted in their entirety; Martin had to identify specific pages or excerpts. The court explained that video footage itself is not hearsay, although statements captured in a video might be hearsay unless an exception applied. It also explained that expert reports generally are hearsay, although a report might be used for purposes such as refreshing an expert’s recollection. An expert could rely on hearsay when experts in the field would reasonably do so, but expert testimony could not be used to present otherwise inadmissible hearsay to the jury.

The court ruled that exhibits offered only to support the City’s claimed immunity under California Vehicle Code section 17004.7 were not admissible because that statute did not apply in this case. Training materials could still be relevant if they concerned the conduct challenged in the case.

Plaintiff’s Motions in Limine

Motion No. 1. Martin moved to exclude information that Officer Ribeiro did not know when he struck Martin with his car. To the extent the motion sought blanket exclusion without identifying specific evidence, the court denied the motion without prejudice. The court separately ruled as follows:

- The request to exclude toxicology reports was denied. Although Ribeiro said he did not know Martin was intoxicated at the time, the defendants could argue that Martin’s intoxication contributed to the collision and affected the reliability of Martin’s account. - The court reserved ruling on whether security guards could testify. The guards did not see the collision, but their testimony could bear on Martin’s credibility and the defendants’ theories about whether Martin knowingly fled from police or appeared to reach for a weapon. The court cautioned that the trial should not become sidetracked by whether Martin actually brandished a weapon at the guards. - The court ruled that two 2014 convictions involving falsely representing himself to a police officer and providing false information to a police officer were admissible for impeachment under Federal Rule of Evidence 609(a)(2), which requires admission of convictions involving a dishonest act or false statement. - The court ruled that convictions for robbery, vehicle theft, felony driving under the influence causing injury, and felony hit and run causing injury were inadmissible under Rule 609(a)(1). Even assuming the defendants were correct that those crimes were punishable by more than one year in prison, their probative value was weak and the risk of unfair prejudice was relatively high. The court also noted that some convictions might implicate the stricter ten-year rule in Rule 609(b)(1). - The court ruled that convictions for felony reckless driving while evading a peace officer could not be admitted under Rule 609(a)(1) because the cited statute provided for a maximum punishment of one year, not more than one year. Two incidents occurring about eight years apart, even considered with the false-information incident, did not establish a habit under Rule 406. - The court declined to admit the nature of Martin’s crimes and incarcerations as evidence of damages. It allowed evidence of when Martin was incarcerated during the three years before the incident and at any time after the incident, but not evidence about the crimes underlying those incarcerations. The court declined to bifurcate liability and damages. - The court would not admit Martin’s conviction for brandishing a weapon merely as a conviction. The defendants could introduce evidence about whether Martin brandished a weapon, but the conviction itself could come in if Martin testified that he did not brandish a weapon and thereby opened the door. - The court stated that current criminal charges against Martin were not admissible merely because they were charges. If the proceedings resulted in convictions before trial, the court would likely allow evidence about periods of incarceration but not the specific crimes.

Motion No. 2. Martin sought to exclude or limit testimony by the defendants’ video expert, Jeff Flower. The bulk of the motion was moot because the defendants agreed that Flower should not testify about whether Ribeiro misjudged the distance between the police car and Martin or aggressively turned the car away from Martin. The court denied the motion to the extent it sought to bar Flower from testifying about whether the police car moved backward. Martin could cross-examine Flower about the video evidence.

Motion No. 3. Martin challenged testimony by the defendants’ medical expert, Dr. Cohen, concerning the cause of Martin’s injuries. The court deferred ruling. It had no concern about Cohen’s qualifications but found the record insufficiently clear about the methodology he used to reach his opinions. The court allowed voir dire of Cohen at trial to determine whether he could testify to the jury. If permitted to testify, Cohen could not testify about whether the collision was accidental rather than intentional or about what Ribeiro was thinking.

Defendants’ Motions in Limine

Motion No. 1. The defendants sought to limit testimony by Martin’s experts John Ryan, Dr. Smith, and Robert Johnson.

The court barred Ryan from offering an opinion that Ribeiro used “excessive force” or acted “objectively unreasonably” in this case. Ryan could testify about police standards, training, practices, and procedures, including whether conduct in hypothetical situations complied with those practices. He could not use specialized legal terms to tell the jury what legal conclusion to reach, although the court did not absolutely prohibit ordinary uses of words such as “reasonable” or “unreasonable.” Ryan could testify about the availability of alternative police tactics because the court considered alternatives relevant to the civil-rights and negligence claims. Ryan could also give limited testimony about standard police practices when an officer hits and runs over a person with a police vehicle, but the court would not allow broader testimony about backing up because it was not convinced that Ryan had specialized expertise helpful to the jury on that issue.

The court agreed that Dr. Smith, a biomechanical-engineering expert, could not provide medical diagnoses or medical opinions. It did not agree that Smith was barred from all testimony about injury causation. Smith could testify about the general forces that cause injuries and how a hypothetical person’s body might respond to those forces, within the scope of his expertise. The court stated that Smith’s opinions were supported by more specific materials than Cohen’s opinions.

The request concerning economist Robert Johnson was moot because Martin agreed that Johnson could not offer legal opinions or incorporate jury instructions into his testimony.

Motion No. 2. The defendants sought to exclude or limit testimony by non-retained experts and by Martin about the causes of his mental or physical conditions. The request concerning Martin’s treating physicians was moot because Martin agreed they would testify only about injuries they observed and treatment they provided. The request concerning Martin’s own testimony was also moot because Martin agreed he could testify about his experiences with his conditions but not offer expert opinions about whether the incident caused or worsened them.

Motion No. 3. The defendants sought to exclude evidence related to healthcare providers who were not being called as witnesses. The court granted in part and denied in part the motion. Martin’s girlfriend, Regina Rodriguez, could testify about what she observed and the assistance she provided, but not about medical matters. Martin confirmed that he would not rely at trial on physical therapists or mental-health providers. However, Martin’s damages experts could testify about possible future medical expenses for physical therapy or mental-health treatment, even though Martin had not received that treatment in the past. The defendants could cross-examine the experts on that issue.

Motion No. 4. The court denied the defendants’ motion without prejudice concerning references to other use-of-force cases. Martin said he would not introduce those cases as evidence but might make comparisons or distinctions during attorney argument, with a witness, or during jury selection. The court allowed some leeway but warned that Martin could not refer to a specific case to send a message to the jury in a way that created unfair prejudice.

Motion No. 5. The defendants sought to exclude evidence about an Independent Police Auditor review and a San Jose Police Department internal investigation that resulted in discipline for Ribeiro. Martin said he did not intend to introduce the conclusions that Ribeiro was negligent or disciplined, but wanted to use evidence collected during the investigations, such as photographs and diagrams. The defendants conceded that such evidence could be admitted with proper foundation. The court stated that the investigative context could be explained to the jury and that a jury instruction could address speculation about the investigations’ conclusions. If reports were admitted, the court stated they would be admitted in whole rather than in selected parts, subject to further rulings at trial.

Motion No. 6. The court ruled that evidence that officers never located a firearm or knife was relevant and was not unfairly prejudicial. That evidence could support Martin’s credibility and cause the jury to question Ribeiro’s credibility. By contrast, evidence that another officer falsely told Martin’s cousin that Martin admitted having a weapon or that a weapon had been found had marginal probative value substantially outweighed by unfair prejudice. The court would not admit that evidence unless Martin opened the door, such as for impeachment.

Motion No. 7. The court denied the defendants’ request to prevent Martin from releasing or pointing others to body-camera footage before the verdict. The court treated the request as a prior restraint on speech and found that it did not meet the required standard. The court also denied the request to bar the jury from seeing post-incident footage or to require that it be played only once. The footage could be relevant to Ribeiro’s credibility and Martin’s pain and suffering. The defendants could object if repeated playback created unfair-prejudice concerns under Rule 403.

Motion No. 8 and Other Trial Matters

The court allowed expert witnesses to remain in the courtroom during trial. Martin’s treating physicians were not considered expert witnesses for this purpose. The court planned to address jury instructions and the jury questionnaire in separate orders. It directed the parties to meet and confer about whether one set of instructions could cover both the § 1983 claim against Ribeiro and the section 52.1 claim against the City. The court planned to create a general verdict form.

The order was a pretrial management and evidence order. It did not decide whether Martin or the defendants were legally entitled to prevail on the remaining claims.