Dominguez v. City Of San Jose

Background

This is an action under Section 1983, a federal civil-rights law, and California Civil Code section 52.1, commonly called the Bane Act. Jessica Dominguez sued the City of San Jose, the San Jose Police Department, and San Jose Police Officer Michael Pina over the fatal police shooting of her deceased husband, Jacob Arturo Dominguez. She sued individually and as guardian ad litem for Mr. Dominguez’s and her three children. At the July 28, 2022 final pretrial conference, the court issued oral rulings on the parties’ motions in limine, which are requests to decide before trial whether particular evidence may be presented.

Plaintiffs’ Motions

Plaintiffs’ Motion in Limine No. 1: Dr. Sudakin and drug-use evidence

Plaintiffs sought to exclude toxicology expert Dr. Daniel L. Sudakin’s testimony about post-mortem drug testing and the behavioral effects of narcotic use. They argued that the testing could not be duplicated and that the testimony was irrelevant because officers allegedly did not know about Mr. Dominguez’s drug use when they shot him. Defendants argued that the expert reasonably relied on toxicology results and that the evidence could corroborate officers’ accounts of Mr. Dominguez’s movements.

The court found that plaintiffs had not shown that Dr. Sudakin’s reliance on the post-mortem toxicology results made his testimony unreliable. It also found the testimony relevant because Mr. Dominguez’s conduct before the shooting was disputed and the evidence could corroborate the officers’ testimony. The court found that the evidence’s probative value outweighed its prejudicial effect and that limiting instructions could reduce possible prejudice.

The court DENIED plaintiffs’ request for a Daubert hearing and DENIED plaintiffs’ motion to exclude Dr. Sudakin’s testimony. The court GRANTED plaintiffs’ request to exclude evidence that drug use caused Mr. Dominguez’s death. Defendants indicated that they did not intend to present that evidence.

Plaintiffs’ Motion in Limine No. 2: Prior criminal conduct

Plaintiffs sought to exclude evidence of Mr. Dominguez’s prior arrests, charges, convictions, gang affiliations, and periods of incarceration. The court found that, to the extent Officer Pina knew about the prior criminal history, it was relevant to the total circumstances for evaluating the reasonableness of his use of force. The court also found that the evidence was being offered to show what Officer Pina knew, rather than to prove the truth of the information or to establish improper character evidence. The court found that the probative value outweighed the prejudicial effect and that limiting instructions could reduce prejudice.

The court DENIED plaintiffs’ second motion in limine.

Plaintiffs’ Motion in Limine No. 3: Information from an informant

Plaintiffs sought to exclude evidence that Mr. Dominguez said he was unwilling to return to jail, that he was armed before his death, and that Sheila Franco was his girlfriend. The court DENIED the motion as to the first two subjects to the extent the evidence was offered to show what Officer Pina knew before the shooting. The court concluded that such evidence was not hearsay when offered for that purpose and that its probative value outweighed its prejudicial effect.

The court GRANTED the motion as to the statement that Ms. Franco was Mr. Dominguez’s girlfriend, to the extent that information was offered to show what officers knew before the shooting. The court found the characterization highly prejudicial and questioned its relevance to Officer Pina’s use of force. The court stated that defendants could instead refer to Ms. Franco as a “known close friend” or “known close associate.” The court DEFERS ruling on whether evidence about the relationship could be offered for damages purposes if plaintiffs were allowed to pursue loss-of-companionship damages.

Plaintiffs’ Motion in Limine No. 4: Sergeant Lopez’s testimony

Plaintiffs sought to exclude Sergeant Alvaro Lopez’s testimony that he would have shot Mr. Dominguez if he had not been trying to set off a flash-bang grenade when Officer Pina shot him. The court DENIED the motion to the extent the testimony was offered to explain why Sergeant Lopez did not shoot Mr. Dominguez, because that explanation could help jurors understand his conduct at the scene. The court GRANTED the motion to the extent the testimony was offered to explain what Sergeant Lopez would have done if he had not been setting off the flash-bang grenade. The court found that this hindsight opinion had little probative value and risked prejudice or confusion.

Defendants’ Motions

Defendants’ Motion in Limine No. 1: Scott DeFoe’s expert testimony

Defendants sought to exclude all eight opinions of plaintiffs’ police-practices expert Scott DeFoe. The court declined to exclude his opinions about Officer Pina’s tactics before the shooting, explaining that events leading up to a shooting may be relevant to the total-circumstances analysis of whether the use of force was reasonable. The court noted, however, that evidence of mere negligence would not be admissible and that the wording of questions at trial would matter. The court DEFERS ruling on testimony concerning Mr. DeFoe’s third opinion until trial because the opinion’s wording appeared speculative.

The court also DEFERS ruling on testimony concerning Mr. DeFoe’s fifth, sixth, and seventh opinions until it is clear how the opinions will be presented and whether the questions can avoid improper legal conclusions. The court found Mr. DeFoe’s fourth opinion—that a reasonable officer would have given Mr. Dominguez a warning—relevant because the parties disputed whether Officer Pina gave adequate warnings.

The court DENIED defendants’ first motion in limine.

Defendants’ Motion in Limine No. 2: Wrongful-death-related damages and claims

Defendants sought to exclude evidence relevant only to a wrongful-death claim, arguing that plaintiffs could pursue only survival claims on behalf of Mr. Dominguez. They also challenged references to the children as plaintiffs, evidence of the family’s losses, and testimony from economic expert Philip Allman.

The court held that Ms. Dominguez and her children could not bring a wrongful-death claim under the Bane Act because that statute provides a personal claim for the individual whose rights were interfered with. The court also stated that, as pleaded, they could not seek wrongful-death damages under the Section 1983 claim based on Mr. Dominguez’s Fourth Amendment excessive-force claim, because Fourth Amendment rights are personal and cannot be asserted on another person’s behalf.

The court concluded that plaintiffs’ pleading appeared to contain the substance of a Fourteenth Amendment claim for loss of familial relationship, but did not use the precise language identifying that claim. The court allowed plaintiffs to seek leave to amend their Second Amended Complaint to add a Fourteenth Amendment violation. The court therefore DEFERS ruling on defendants’ second motion in limine until it decides whether plaintiffs may amend their complaint. Plaintiffs could file a motion of no more than five pages by August 1, 2022; defendants could file a response of no more than five pages by August 5, 2022; and no reply would be allowed.

The court separately ruled that pain-and-suffering damages were unavailable under plaintiffs’ Bane Act claim. It held, however, that plaintiffs could seek pain-and-suffering and loss-of-life damages under the Section 1983 survival claim based on the Fourth Amendment, because applying California’s restriction on those damages to that federal claim would be incompatible with Section 1983’s purposes.

Defendants’ Motion in Limine No. 3: Evidence of drug use

Defendants sought permission to present evidence that Mr. Dominguez was under the influence of methamphetamine and PCP when he was shot. The court found the evidence relevant because it could make defendants’ account of his erratic behavior more plausible, even if officers did not know about the drug use at the time. The court found that the evidence’s probative value outweighed its prejudicial effect and that a limiting instruction could reduce prejudice.

The court GRANTED defendants’ third motion in limine.

Defendants’ Motion in Limine No. 4: Other incidents involving officers

Defendants sought to exclude references to other incidents involving Officer Pina or other testifying officers, including a hotel incident that led to a lawsuit against Officer Pina. The court GRANTED defendants’ fourth motion in limine. It found that plaintiffs had not identified prior incidents or provided details showing their similarity or relevance to this case. The court also noted that plaintiffs’ Monell claim, concerning a municipal custom or policy, had been dismissed, making plaintiffs’ proposed use of other-incident evidence for that purpose moot.

Defendants’ Motion in Limine No. 5: Police-dog evidence and scene photographs

Defendants sought to exclude evidence that a police dog was deployed several minutes after the shooting and bit Mr. Dominguez on the neck. The court found that the evidence might be relevant to describing the post-shooting scene and possible changes to evidence caused by the dog. Because admissibility depended on the purpose for which the evidence was offered, the court DEFERS ruling until trial.

The court cautioned that gruesome scene details could be highly prejudicial. It LIMITS plaintiffs to approximately two photographs if they choose to present photographs of the condition of Mr. Dominguez’s body after the shooting, and also limited the presentation of other evidence concerning the scene.

Disposition

The order ruled on pretrial evidence and related pleading and damages issues; it did not decide the ultimate liability question. The court DENIED plaintiffs’ first motion as to Dr. Sudakin’s testimony and GRANTED it as to evidence that drug use caused Mr. Dominguez’s death; DENIED plaintiffs’ request for a Daubert hearing; DENIED plaintiffs’ second motion; DENIED plaintiffs’ third motion as to the statements about returning to jail and being armed and GRANTED it as to the description of Ms. Franco as Mr. Dominguez’s girlfriend for purposes of showing officers’ knowledge; and DENIED in part and GRANTED in part plaintiffs’ fourth motion concerning Sergeant Lopez’s testimony. The court DENIED defendants’ first motion, DEFERRED defendants’ second motion, GRANTED defendants’ third and fourth motions, and DEFERRED defendants’ fifth motion until trial while limiting scene photographs and other evidence.