LePage v. County of Napa

Nature of the order

This final pretrial order established the procedures and issues for the jury trial. It did not resolve the parties’ underlying dispute over whether Deputy Tim Reid used excessive force against Renee Marie LePage.

Claims and defenses

LePage asserts four claims:

LePage alleges that the County of Napa and the Napa County Sheriff’s Department are legally responsible for Reid’s alleged wrongful acts on the state-law claims, but not on the § 1983 claim. Reid denies using excessive force and denies negligence in entering the courtroom vestibule in response to an emergency. The parties disputed whether Reid used force, whether any force was excessive, whether witnesses saw the encounter, whether LePage was injured, the nature and extent of her damages, and whether Reid acted with reckless disregard, malice, or oppression. The parties identified qualified immunity and LePage’s entitlement to attorney’s fees and costs as issues for the court. The order also states that the Monell allegation had been dismissed from the case.

Stipulated facts

The parties stipulated that the County of Napa was a California public entity and that the Napa County Sheriff’s Department was a subdivision of the County that employed, managed, and supervised deputy sheriffs. They agreed that Reid had worked as a deputy sheriff since August 31, 2015, acted under color of state law, and acted within the scope of his employment.

They also agreed that on December 1, 2015, LePage was lawfully and peacefully in Department E of the Napa County Superior Courthouse for an unrelated case; that she encountered Reid in the vestibule as she exited Courtroom E; that the courtroom entrance had two sets of double doors with a vestibule between them; that attorney conference rooms opened off the vestibule; and that Reid was wearing a department-issued bulletproof vest.

Rulings on motions in limine

A motion in limine is a request for an advance ruling about whether particular evidence may be presented at trial.

LePage’s first motion — granted. The court barred defendants’ expert, Dr. Thomas Mampalam, a neurosurgeon, from diagnosing LePage with a psychological or psychiatric condition or suggesting that she likely had such a disorder. The court found that defendants had not shown that these opinions were based on sufficient facts or data, reliable methods, or a reliable application of those methods. The court also found that the limited value of the opinions was outweighed by the danger of unfair prejudice.

Dr. Mampalam could testify about his physical examination, his view that he had ruled out a physical basis for LePage’s symptoms, and his opinion that her surgeries were unnecessary. He could also testify generally that symptoms not caused by a physical condition might have a psychological or psychiatric cause, but he could not apply that conclusion to LePage specifically or say that a hypothetical patient definitely had a psychological or psychiatric disorder.

LePage’s second motion — granted as unopposed. The court barred defendants from referring to Molly Hendry as LePage’s “criminal defense attorney,” “public defender,” or using similar descriptions, and barred questions designed to elicit that Hendry was a public defender or had represented LePage in a criminal matter. Hendry could be referred to simply as LePage’s attorney.

LePage’s third motion — granted in part. The court barred defendants from introducing evidence, asking questions, or arguing that third parties—such as insurers or federal, state, or local sources—paid LePage directly, provided her benefits, or paid expenses such as medical bills on her behalf.

The court did not decide the separate dispute about whether medical-expense damages should be based on amounts billed or amounts accepted by medical providers. The court directed the parties to meet and confer and, if necessary, submit a joint letter brief by October 1, 2019.

LePage’s fourth motion — granted as unopposed. Captain Cullen Dodd could not be presented as an expert witness or have his testimony characterized as expert opinion.

Defendants’ motion about Reid’s later conduct — denied without prejudice. The court declined to exclude all possible evidence about Reid’s unrelated post-incident conduct in advance. If LePage identified specific evidence she wanted to offer, she had to raise the issue outside the jury’s presence, where defendants could object. The court separately ruled that the particular incident identified by defendants was inadmissible under Federal Rule of Evidence 403.

Exhibit rulings

The court explained that portions of Napa County Sheriff’s Department reports containing the reporting officer’s own observations and knowledge could qualify for the public-records exception to the hearsay rule. Statements by other people recorded in those reports would be inadmissible unless a separate hearsay exception applied. The parties were directed to confer about the reports and submit a joint letter brief if needed.

The court overruled LePage’s objection to her administrative claim against Napa County because she had submitted it herself and it could be treated as a statement of an opposing party. The court also overruled her objection to Reid’s standards and training report, finding that the report could qualify as a business record.

The court directed the parties to confer about whether deposition testimony from Cullen Dodd, Jeff Matlock, and Geoffrey Rochester could be used even though defendants planned to make those witnesses available to testify live.

Trial procedures and jury instructions

The jury trial was scheduled to begin October 15, 2019, in San Francisco and last up to three days. Each side received four hours for direct and cross-examination, up to 30 minutes for opening statements, and up to 45 minutes for closing argument. The order also addressed witness lists, deposition excerpts, exhibit procedures, the order of proof, and a jury questionnaire.

The court decided that the agreed federal excessive-force instruction should also apply to LePage’s state-law battery claim. The court relied on the similarity between the factors used to evaluate unreasonable force under California law and excessive force under § 1983 and concluded that using one instruction would reduce jury confusion. The court stated that it would file a proposed verdict form separately.