Leubner v. County of Lake

Background

Milos Leubner, proceeding without a lawyer, sued County of Lake, Dennis Keithly, and Michael Penhall under 42 U.S.C. § 1983, a federal law allowing claims for violations of constitutional rights by state actors. The case concerned a September 15, 2016 search of Leubner’s residence and property. Lake County officers seized and destroyed marijuana plants, and state authorities charged Leubner with marijuana-related offenses. Those charges were dismissed on May 16, 2017, after Leubner forfeited the seized items except firearms.

Leubner’s second amended complaint alleged violations of the First, Fourth, Eighth, and Fourteenth Amendments. He challenged the search warrant, the seizure of marijuana, three alleged arrests or restraints during the search, a September 16 entry into his residence, the failure to provide him with a copy of the warrant, interruptions during questioning, Lake County Ordinance 2997, the lack of a hearing, the disconnection of electricity, the declaration that his residence was uninhabitable, the towing of vehicles, the removal of his adult daughter, the failure to provide allegedly exculpatory information to the warrant-issuing judge, and the lack of a pretrial hearing. He also asserted claims against Lake County based on alleged policies or customs and alleged a conspiracy.

Court’s analysis

The court applied the legal standard for a motion to dismiss for failure to state a claim. Under that standard, a complaint must provide a legally recognized theory and enough factual allegations to make the claim plausible.

Fourth Amendment claims. The court rejected Leubner’s challenge to the September 15 search and seizure. It found that he did not identify a false statement in Dennis Keithly’s warrant affidavit or show that Keithly had a duty to include the information Leubner identified. The court also found that the warrant adequately identified the legal basis for the search and specifically described the premises to be searched.

The court concluded that Leubner’s first two alleged restraints during the search were permitted detentions of occupants while officers executed a search warrant. As to the third alleged arrest, the court found that Leubner did not explain why it lacked probable cause and that the warrant and Keithly’s affidavit supported probable cause. The court also stated that authorized medical-marijuana status did not prevent an arrest when officers had probable cause to believe that possession or cultivation had occurred.

The court rejected the claim concerning Keithly’s September 16 entry because the claim was untimely and did not relate back to the original complaint. The court alternatively found that Leubner did not allege an actionable injury from the approximately 45-second entry. It further held that qualified immunity, a protection for government officials when the law did not clearly establish that their conduct was unlawful, would protect Keithly even if the entry violated the Fourth Amendment. The court also dismissed the claim based on the failure to provide Leubner a copy of the warrant, explaining that he did not support that claim with controlling authority.

First Amendment claims. The court found that Leubner did not state a First Amendment claim based on Keithly’s interruptions during questioning. It also dismissed the claims challenging Ordinance 2997, concluding that Leubner did not identify the allegedly misleading provisions or explain how the ordinance regulated speech. The court rejected his claim that the county violated the First Amendment by failing to provide physical access to printed ordinances, and it rejected the claim concerning an alleged right to a hearing under the ordinance because the ordinance did not displace the state criminal laws underlying the warrant.

Fourteenth Amendment claims. The court concluded that Leubner was not entitled to procedures under Ordinance 2997 because he did not show that the ordinance replaced the state criminal laws involved in the search. It rejected his claims concerning the electricity disconnection, the declaration that his residence was uninhabitable, and the vehicle towing because California provided an adequate remedy after the alleged property deprivations. The court also dismissed the claim concerning the removal of Leubner’s adult daughter, finding that the constitutional privacy protection cited by Leubner did not establish a right to prevent authorities from removing her during an authorized search.

The court rejected the claim that Keithly violated due process by failing to provide allegedly exculpatory information to the judge because it was based on the same theory as the rejected warrant-deception claim. It also dismissed the claim concerning a missing pretrial hearing because the documents attached to the complaint showed that Leubner appeared in the criminal proceeding and apparently had an opportunity to present a medical-marijuana defense.

The court separately dismissed claims raised only through handwritten criticisms and other materials attached to the complaint. These included a claim based on the lack of a warning before questioning, which the court held was not actionable under § 1983, and a claim concerning the seizure of a cell phone, which the court held was covered by the valid search warrant.

Municipal-liability and conspiracy claims

The court dismissed the claims against Lake County based on alleged policies or customs. It found that Leubner had not adequately alleged an underlying constitutional violation and had offered only conclusory allegations that the challenged practices were routine. The court also explained that the injunction discussed in the opinion concerned warrantless searches, while Leubner challenged searches allegedly conducted without giving him an opportunity to use the local ordinance’s abatement procedures. Finally, because Leubner did not state a constitutional claim against the defendants, the court dismissed the conspiracy claim.

Disposition

Judge Phyllis J. Hamilton granted defendants’ motion to dismiss. The court dismissed the second amended complaint and the action with prejudice, expressly concluding that further amendment would be futile.