Richards v. Tumlin

Background

Larry Richards sued the City and County of San Francisco, Jeffrey Tumlin, Gwyneth Borden, Amanda Eaken, Cheryl Brinkman, Steve Heminger, Sharon Lai, Manny Yekutiel, Mike Hawkins, City Attorney Dennis Herrera, Mayor London Breed, and private defendants who had not appeared. The private defendants included a purported contractor, Auto Return, which apparently provides automobile towing and storage services for the County, along with unspecified employees.

Richards alleged that defendants towed his car on April 6, 2021, while it was lawfully parked in San Francisco. The car displayed a blue disabled-persons “hang tag.” He alleged that, between April 6 and May 7, he repeatedly contacted the San Francisco Municipal Transportation Agency to seek a low-income waiver of towing and storage fees and a legally required tow hearing. He also visited Auto Return and the agency’s office to prove his eligibility for the waiver.

Richards brought two claims under 42 U.S.C. § 1983, the federal civil-rights statute that permits claims against state or local actors for violating federal rights. He alleged violations of due process under the Fifth and Fourteenth Amendments and equal protection under the Fourteenth Amendment. Because he sued the County, the court also understood him to be asserting municipal liability under the rule commonly called Monell, which requires a connection between a local government policy or practice and the alleged constitutional violation.

Motion and analysis

The San Francisco defendants filed a renewed motion to dismiss under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(6). That rule tests whether the complaint states a legally sufficient claim. They argued that Richards had not alleged exhaustion of administrative remedies, had not provided enough facts to support his claims, and had not explained how the individual defendants participated in the alleged misconduct. They later argued that the case should also be dismissed because Richards failed to prosecute it by not responding to the motion.

The court held that Richards had not alleged sufficient facts to state a claim against the San Francisco defendants. For the municipal-liability claim, he did not allege that the County maintained a policy or practice of unconstitutionally towing vehicles or denying adequate procedures to people challenging vehicle towing. He also did not identify what County policy or lack of policy was constitutionally deficient or explain why the benefits of additional procedures would outweigh their burdens.

The court stated that Ninth Circuit authority suggested Richards’s due-process claim was not legally viable because California law provides procedural remedies for contesting parking-related violations. The court found that Richards’s equal-protection claim also failed because he did not allege that the San Francisco defendants acted with an intent to deny him a waiver or hearing because of his disability.

The court also found that Richards failed to prosecute the case. After he did not timely oppose the motion, the court gave him another opportunity to respond. He did not file an opposition or a consent to proceed before the previously assigned magistrate judge. The court concluded that dismissal of the entire action was proper on that basis as well.

The court did not decide the San Francisco defendants’ exhaustion argument. It stated that the defendants had not provided authority showing that failure to exhaust could support dismissal under Rule 12(b)(6) in these circumstances, and that such a defense may be considered on a motion to dismiss only when the failure is clearly shown on the face of the complaint.

Disposition

The court granted the San Francisco defendants’ renewed motion to dismiss and dismissed all claims against them without prejudice because the defendants had not shown that allowing Richards to amend would be futile. The court terminated the original motion to dismiss.

The court further stated that Richards’s claims against the private defendants were subject to dismissal for the same reasons. Separately, the court found that Richards appeared not to have served those defendants within 90 days of filing the action and had not shown good cause for the failure. The order therefore stated that the claims against the private defendants must be dismissed on that ground as well.

Richards was given 28 days to file an amended complaint correcting the deficiencies. If he did not timely amend or correct all deficiencies, the court stated that it would dismiss the action with prejudice. The court also stated that, unless Richards submitted a declaration showing good cause for the failure to timely serve the private defendants, the order would operate as a dismissal with prejudice as to those claims.