Cupp v. Smith

Background

Ronald Cupp brought claims under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 concerning Andrew Smith’s alleged unconstitutional search of Cupp’s property on February 15, 2019. The court’s earlier order dismissed Cupp’s claims against several defendants and allowed him to amend only his § 1983 search claim and state-law trespass claim against Smith, along with a possible municipal-liability claim against Sonoma County. Cupp’s first amended complaint added allegations supporting the municipal-liability claim and also included a trespass claim against Tennis Wick, a person whose claims had previously been dismissed.

Sonoma County and Wick moved to dismiss. Cupp separately moved to strike 14 of Smith’s 20 affirmative defenses, which are defenses asserted in an answer to reduce or defeat liability.

Wick’s Status

The court held that Wick was not a defendant in the action. The court’s prior order had dismissed all six claims asserted against Wick with prejudice and had allowed Cupp to amend only specified claims against Smith and Sonoma County. The court therefore struck the first amended complaint’s references to Wick as a defendant, including the identified paragraphs 2, 10, 44, and 45. The court also stated that the docket’s failure to list Wick as a terminated defendant was a ministerial oversight.

Sonoma County’s Motion to Dismiss

The court analyzed Cupp’s claim under Monell, the rule allowing a local government to be held liable under § 1983 when an official policy or practice causes a constitutional violation. The court concluded that Cupp failed to allege sufficient facts showing that Sonoma County maintained a policy of conducting unlawful searches. The allegations describing failures to train, supervise, investigate, discipline, or implement warrant procedures were treated as conclusory statements and a formulaic recitation of the elements of a Monell claim. The court also found that Cupp’s reliance on what he believed to be true did not satisfy the reasonable inquiry required by Rule 11 in the circumstances described.

The court separately concluded that Cupp failed to allege facts showing that any Sonoma County policy caused Smith’s alleged unlawful entry. The allegations connecting the county’s policies to the February 15, 2019 entry were also conclusory. Facts raised for the first time in Cupp’s opposition did not change the result because they were not alleged in the amended complaint and, even if accepted as true, did not adequately establish policy or causation.

The court denied Cupp further leave to amend the Monell claim. It reasoned that Cupp had already received two opportunities to provide additional facts and that further amendment would be futile. The court therefore granted Sonoma County’s motion to dismiss the Monell claim against it with prejudice. Sonoma County was no longer a defendant, leaving Andrew Smith as the only remaining defendant identified in the order.

Motion to Strike Smith’s Defenses

The court treated Cupp as having abandoned his challenges to several defenses because he did not address them in a reply. It considered three remaining defenses: assumption of risk, absolute immunity, and reservation of the right to assert additional defenses.

The court struck the assumption-of-risk defense because Smith’s answer gave only vague allegations about Cupp’s knowledge and appreciation of risks and did not connect those allegations to a specific event or explain how Cupp assumed the risk. The court struck the absolute-immunity defense without prejudice because Smith did not identify supporting legal authority, explain how the defense differed from his qualified-immunity and statutory-immunity defenses, or explain why his conduct would fall within absolute immunity.

The court struck the reservation-of-rights defense with prejudice, holding that reserving the right to assert additional affirmative defenses later is not itself a proper affirmative defense. The court stated that Smith would need to seek permission to add another defense later.

Amended Answer and Disposition

The court granted Cupp’s motion to strike Smith’s assumption-of-risk and absolute-immunity defenses, while allowing Smith one opportunity to amend those defenses to correct their pleading deficiencies. Smith was also ordered to amend six defenses that his counsel had agreed to amend and to remove the defenses of res judicata, consent, privilege, and reservation of rights. Without court permission or Cupp’s consent, Smith could not otherwise amend his answer. The amended answer had to include a separate redline showing every change.

The order was a procedural order because the court ruled on the legal sufficiency of the municipal-liability claim under a motion-to-dismiss standard and on the adequacy of affirmative defenses, rather than deciding the underlying search claim on the merits.